Commit Graph

3 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
payneio
340f469b3d feat(core): single-source data_dir/repos_dir via castle.yaml
The `castle` CLI and the `castle-api` service are two independent in-process
drivers of `castle_core`. Each resolved DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR at import time from
its own process env (default /data/castle), persisted nowhere — so they silently
diverged, and `apply`/dashboard-apply crashed on a non-existent /data.

Make the loaded CastleConfig the single source of truth:
- Resolve data_dir/repos_dir only in load_config (env > castle.yaml > default),
  anchored to the config root; drop the DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR module globals and the
  import-time file read entirely — no global twin that can disagree with the file.
- Thread config.data_dir/repos_dir through ensure_dirs, _env_context, tls_dir_for
  (now unified — deploy no longer inlines the tls path), and create/add/clone.
- ensure_dirs raises an actionable CastleDirError instead of a bare PermissionError;
  the api surfaces it as 422.
- doctor: "data dir writable" check + WARN when CASTLE_DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR env
  overrides the file (the one remaining cross-process divergence vector).
- install.sh persists data_dir/repos_dir into castle.yaml (idempotent, non-default).
- Docs: registry.md globals + AGENTS.md roots.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-07-06 23:02:33 -07:00
Paul Payne
c5cf3a1561 feat(core): kind-scoped deployment identity (name, kind)
A deployment's identity becomes (name, kind), so a tool, service, and job can
share a name (a `backup` trio). Kind is structural — which per-kind store / dir —
not a derived discriminator threaded around.

- CastleConfig holds per-kind stores (services/jobs/tools/statics/references);
  all_deployments()/deployments_named()/deployment(kind,name) replace the single
  flat `deployments` dict. A construction-only `deployments` InitVar routes a flat
  map into the stores by kind_for.
- Storage: deployments/<store>/<name>.yaml (per-kind dirs), with read-compat for
  the old flat + services/+jobs/ layouts.
- Registry keyed by composite "<kind>/<name>" + name field; get()/all()/named()/put().
- Job units carry a -job marker (castle-<name>-job.{service,timer}); services and
  everything else unchanged — so a service and a job can coexist.
- deploy/apply/lifecycle thread kind through unit naming, activate/deactivate,
  is_active; caddyfile/tunnel/relations iterate via all_deployments/registry.all.
- Subdomain uniqueness validated across kinds (a service and a static can't share one).

182 core tests pass, incl. a new same-name-trio suite (round-trip, distinct units,
subdomain guard). API/CLI/UI updated in follow-up phases.
2026-07-06 02:25:05 -07:00
Paul Payne
3c566540aa feat: raw-TCP exposure with castle-managed TLS + reach model
Expose raw-TCP services (postgres) by name at <name>.<domain>:<port> and
cut the gateway's ACME wildcard cert onto them so they present a trusted
cert. Replaces the proxy/public booleans with a single `reach` enum
(off|internal|public); legacy input still parses via derived accessors.

Core:
- expose.tcp{port,tls} + TlsSpec(material: pair|combined|off, reload)
- tls.py: materialize cert files from Caddy's wildcard, reconcile on
  renewal; `castle tls` CLI; optional cert_obtained events-exec hook
  (gateway.cert_hook, gated so a plugin-less Caddy still parses)
- apply waits (bounded) for the wildcard to issue before materializing so
  a fresh-node TLS service starts with its cert in place, then scopes
  materialization to the deployments being applied
- reach: internal|public requires an expose block (no silent no-op);
  public raw-TCP guarded until tunnel support lands
- chain.pem (${tls_ca}) is the issuer chain (leaf stripped), a real CA
  bundle distinct from cert.pem
- one shared ${...} resolver (resolve_placeholders) for env and container
  run fields; run.env now expands like volumes/args; $$ escapes a literal
- validate the generated Caddyfile before reloading the gateway so an
  invalid config never degrades routing

Docs: docs/tcp-exposure.md. Tests cover reach/expose validation,
placeholder expansion + escape, issuer-chain material, TLS materialize.
2026-07-04 23:04:26 -07:00