Security hardening: input validation, secrets protection, NATS auth

Config injection prevention:
- Add FQDN validation for domain names (RFC 1123) in Register/Update —
  rejects newlines, spaces, shell metacharacters that could inject into
  HAProxy/dnsmasq configs
- Add backend address validation (valid host:port format, valid IP or
  hostname, port 1-65535). DNS-only backends allow bare IPs.
- Add header key/value validation — keys must be HTTP token chars only,
  values must not contain newlines or NULs
- Add WireGuard peer name validation (alphanumeric + hyphens + underscores)
- Add defense-in-depth domain validation in certbot Provision()

Secrets protection:
- Remove ?raw=true bypass on GET /api/v1/secrets — secrets are now always
  redacted in API responses regardless of query parameters
- Update test to verify redaction cannot be bypassed

NATS authentication:
- Generate random auth token on first startup, store in secrets.yaml
- Pass token to embedded NATS server via Authorization option
- Internal client connects with the same token
- External NATS clients (Wild Cloud) must now authenticate

Security headers:
- Add X-Content-Type-Options: nosniff
- Add X-Frame-Options: DENY
- Add Cache-Control: no-store

internal/api/v1/handlers.go

@@ -406,11 +406,7 @@ func (api *API) GetGlobalSecrets(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
 		return
 	}
 
-	showRaw := r.URL.Query().Get("raw") == "true"
-	if !showRaw {
-		redactSecrets(secretsMap)
-	}
-
+	redactSecrets(secretsMap)
 	respondJSON(w, http.StatusOK, secretsMap)
 }
 

internal/api/v1/handlers_config_test.go

@@ -138,7 +138,7 @@ func TestGetGlobalSecrets_RedactsLeafValues(t *testing.T) {
 	}
 }
 
-func TestGetGlobalSecrets_RawShowsValues(t *testing.T) {
+func TestGetGlobalSecrets_AlwaysRedacted(t *testing.T) {
 	api, tmpDir := setupTestAPI(t)
 
 	secrets := map[string]any{
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ func TestGetGlobalSecrets_RawShowsValues(t *testing.T) {
 	data, _ := yaml.Marshal(secrets)
 	os.WriteFile(filepath.Join(tmpDir, "secrets.yaml"), data, 0600)
 
+	// Even with ?raw=true, secrets must be redacted (bypass removed for security)
 	req := httptest.NewRequest("GET", "/api/v1/secrets?raw=true", nil)
 	w := httptest.NewRecorder()
 
@@ -158,8 +159,8 @@ func TestGetGlobalSecrets_RawShowsValues(t *testing.T) {
 	json.Unmarshal(w.Body.Bytes(), &resp)
 
 	cf := resp["cloudflare"].(map[string]any)
-	if cf["apiToken"] != "my-token" {
-		t.Errorf("expected raw apiToken, got %v", cf["apiToken"])
+	if cf["apiToken"] == "my-token" {
+		t.Error("expected apiToken to be redacted, but got raw value")
 	}
 }
 

internal/api/v1/middleware.go

@@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ func RequestLoggingMiddleware(next http.Handler) http.Handler {
 			return
 		}
 
+		// Security response headers
+		w.Header().Set("X-Content-Type-Options", "nosniff")
+		w.Header().Set("X-Frame-Options", "DENY")
+		w.Header().Set("Cache-Control", "no-store")
+
 		start := time.Now()
 		sw := &statusResponseWriter{ResponseWriter: w, status: http.StatusOK}
 		next.ServeHTTP(sw, r)

internal/certbot/manager.go

@@ -61,6 +61,13 @@ func (m *Manager) Provision(domain, email string) error {
 	if email == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("email is required")
 	}
+	// Defense-in-depth: reject domains with shell metacharacters.
+	// Domain validation at the API boundary should already prevent this.
+	for _, c := range domain {
+		if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '-' || c == '.' || c == '*') {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid domain for cert provisioning: %q", domain)
+		}
+	}
 	if _, err := os.Stat(m.credsPath); err != nil {
 		return fmt.Errorf("cloudflare credentials not found at %s; configure the Cloudflare API token first", m.credsPath)
 	}

internal/domains/manager.go

@@ -9,8 +9,10 @@ package domains
 import (
 	"fmt"
 	"log/slog"
+	"net"
 	"os"
 	"path/filepath"
+	"strconv"
 	"strings"
 	"sync"
 
@@ -161,6 +163,86 @@ func (m *Manager) domainPath(domain string) string {
 	return filepath.Join(m.domainsDir(), domainToFilename(domain))
 }
 
+// isValidDomain checks that a string is a valid FQDN (RFC 1123) or wildcard domain.
+// Prevents config injection via newlines, spaces, or shell metacharacters.
+func isValidDomain(s string) bool {
+	if len(s) == 0 || len(s) > 253 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, label := range strings.Split(s, ".") {
+		if len(label) == 0 || len(label) > 63 {
+			return false
+		}
+		if label[0] == '-' || label[len(label)-1] == '-' {
+			return false
+		}
+		for _, c := range label {
+			if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '-' || c == '*') {
+				return false
+			}
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// isValidBackendAddress checks that an address is a valid host:port.
+func isValidBackendAddress(addr string) bool {
+	host, portStr, err := net.SplitHostPort(addr)
+	if err != nil {
+		return false
+	}
+	port, err := strconv.Atoi(portStr)
+	if err != nil || port < 1 || port > 65535 {
+		return false
+	}
+	if net.ParseIP(host) != nil {
+		return true
+	}
+	return isValidDomain(host)
+}
+
+// isValidHeaderName checks that a header name contains only HTTP token characters.
+func isValidHeaderName(s string) bool {
+	if len(s) == 0 {
+		return false
+	}
+	for _, c := range s {
+		if c <= ' ' || c == ':' || c == '"' || c >= 0x7f {
+			return false
+		}
+	}
+	return true
+}
+
+// isValidHeaderValue checks that a header value contains no newlines or NULs.
+func isValidHeaderValue(s string) bool {
+	return !strings.ContainsAny(s, "\r\n\x00")
+}
+
+// validateHeaders checks all header keys and values in a HeaderConfig.
+func validateHeaders(h *HeaderConfig) error {
+	if h == nil {
+		return nil
+	}
+	for k, v := range h.Request {
+		if !isValidHeaderName(k) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid request header name: %q", k)
+		}
+		if !isValidHeaderValue(v) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid request header value for %q", k)
+		}
+	}
+	for k, v := range h.Response {
+		if !isValidHeaderName(k) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid response header name: %q", k)
+		}
+		if !isValidHeaderValue(v) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid response header value for %q", k)
+		}
+	}
+	return nil
+}
+
 // Register creates or updates a domain registration.
 func (m *Manager) Register(dom Domain) error {
 	m.mu.Lock()
@@ -169,6 +251,9 @@ func (m *Manager) Register(dom Domain) error {
 	if dom.DomainName == "" {
 		return fmt.Errorf("domain is required")
 	}
+	if !isValidDomain(dom.DomainName) {
+		return fmt.Errorf("invalid domain name: %q", dom.DomainName)
+	}
 
 	hasBackend := dom.Backend.Address != ""
 	hasRoutes := len(dom.Routes) > 0
@@ -185,14 +270,28 @@ func (m *Manager) Register(dom Domain) error {
 			if r.Backend.Address == "" {
 				return fmt.Errorf("route %d: backend address is required", i)
 			}
+			if !isValidBackendAddress(r.Backend.Address) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("route %d: invalid backend address: %q", i, r.Backend.Address)
+			}
 			if r.Backend.Type == "" {
 				return fmt.Errorf("route %d: backend type is required", i)
 			}
+			if err := validateHeaders(r.Headers); err != nil {
+				return fmt.Errorf("route %d: %w", i, err)
+			}
 		}
 	} else {
 		if dom.Backend.Type == "" {
 			return fmt.Errorf("backend type is required")
 		}
+		// dns-only backends may omit port (just an IP for resolution)
+		if dom.Backend.Type == BackendDNSOnly {
+			if net.ParseIP(dom.Backend.Address) == nil && !isValidBackendAddress(dom.Backend.Address) {
+				return fmt.Errorf("invalid backend address: %q", dom.Backend.Address)
+			}
+		} else if !isValidBackendAddress(dom.Backend.Address) {
+			return fmt.Errorf("invalid backend address: %q", dom.Backend.Address)
+		}
 	}
 
 	// Default TLS mode based on backend type

internal/natsbus/server.go

@@ -37,8 +37,9 @@ type Server struct {
 
 // Config for the embedded NATS server.
 type Config struct {
-	Port    int    // listen port (default 4222)
-	DataDir string // JetStream storage directory
+	Port      int    // listen port (default 4222)
+	DataDir   string // JetStream storage directory
+	AuthToken string // require this token for client connections (empty = no auth)
 }
 
 // Start launches the embedded NATS server with JetStream and creates
@@ -52,9 +53,11 @@ func Start(cfg Config) (*Server, error) {
 		Port:      cfg.Port,
 		JetStream: true,
 		StoreDir:  cfg.DataDir,
-		// Quiet logging — NATS logs at its own level
-		NoLog:  true,
-		NoSigs: true,
+		NoLog:     true,
+		NoSigs:    true,
+	}
+	if cfg.AuthToken != "" {
+		opts.Authorization = cfg.AuthToken
 	}
 
 	ns, err := natsserver.NewServer(opts)
@@ -87,7 +90,11 @@ func Start(cfg Config) (*Server, error) {
 	slog.Info("NATS JetStream server started", "port", cfg.Port, "dataDir", cfg.DataDir)
 
 	// Connect as internal client
-	nc, err := nats.Connect(ns.ClientURL())
+	connectOpts := []nats.Option{}
+	if cfg.AuthToken != "" {
+		connectOpts = append(connectOpts, nats.Token(cfg.AuthToken))
+	}
+	nc, err := nats.Connect(ns.ClientURL(), connectOpts...)
 	if err != nil {
 		ns.Shutdown()
 		return nil, fmt.Errorf("connecting to embedded NATS: %w", err)

internal/wireguard/manager.go

@@ -229,6 +229,13 @@ func (m *Manager) readPeerFile(path string) (*Peer, error) {
 // AddPeer generates a new peer keypair, assigns the next available IP in the VPN
 // subnet, saves the peer, and returns it.
 func (m *Manager) AddPeer(name string) (*Peer, error) {
+	// Validate peer name — prevents config injection via wg0.conf comments
+	for _, c := range name {
+		if !((c >= 'a' && c <= 'z') || (c >= 'A' && c <= 'Z') || (c >= '0' && c <= '9') || c == '-' || c == '_' || c == ' ') {
+			return nil, fmt.Errorf("invalid peer name: only letters, digits, hyphens, underscores, and spaces allowed")
+		}
+	}
+
 	cfg, err := m.GetConfig()
 	if err != nil {
 		return nil, err

main.go

@@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ import (
 	"github.com/wild-cloud/wild-central/internal/frontend"
 	"github.com/wild-cloud/wild-central/internal/logging"
 	"github.com/wild-cloud/wild-central/internal/natsbus"
+	"github.com/wild-cloud/wild-central/internal/secrets"
 )
 
 var startTime time.Time
@@ -99,9 +100,19 @@ func main() {
 		fmt.Sscanf(v, "%d", &natsPort)
 	}
 
+	// Load or generate NATS auth token from secrets
+	secretsMgr := secrets.NewManager(filepath.Join(dataDir, "secrets.yaml"))
+	natsToken, _ := secretsMgr.GetSecret("nats.authToken")
+	if natsToken == "" {
+		natsToken, _ = secrets.GenerateSecret(32)
+		_ = secretsMgr.SetSecret("nats.authToken", natsToken)
+		slog.Info("generated NATS auth token", "component", "startup")
+	}
+
 	natsSrv, err := natsbus.Start(natsbus.Config{
-		Port:    natsPort,
-		DataDir: natsDataDir,
+		Port:      natsPort,
+		DataDir:   natsDataDir,
+		AuthToken: natsToken,
 	})
 	if err != nil {
 		slog.Error("failed to start NATS server", "error", err)