docs: a mesh runbook in place of the finished plan
docs/mesh.md says what runs where (castle-nats, castle-openbao, each node's wildpc-api), how to tell it is healthy, what to do when a node goes stale, the vault is sealed or NATS is down, and the routine tasks -- written from the live config, not the plan. The plan is done and goes; its history is in git, and its unfinished items are tasks in Wild Life. AGENTS.md used the services' old names (wildpc-nats, wildpc-openbao) and pointed at the plan for operations; it now names castle-* and points here.
This commit is contained in:
@@ -260,7 +260,7 @@ resolve through a backend selected by the **`secrets:` block in `wildpc.yaml`**
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```yaml
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secrets:
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backend: openbao # or `file` (default)
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addr: https://wildpc-openbao.<domain>:8200
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addr: https://castle-openbao.<domain>:8200
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mount: wildpc # KV-v2 mount
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token_secret: OPENBAO_ROOT_TOKEN # vault token, read from a file
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node_prefix: nodes/<host> # optional: per-node overrides
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@@ -310,8 +310,8 @@ a service public unless it authenticates or is meant to be open.
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## 8. Mesh — multi-node coordination (opt-in)
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Runs on **NATS JetStream** (`wildpc-nats`, TLS + token). Enable via env on
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`wildpc-api`: `WILDPC_API_NATS_ENABLED=true`, `WILDPC_API_NATS_URL=tls://wildpc-nats.<domain>:4222`,
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Runs on **NATS JetStream** (`castle-nats`, TLS + token). Enable via env on
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`wildpc-api`: `WILDPC_API_NATS_ENABLED=true`, `WILDPC_API_NATS_URL=tls://castle-nats.<domain>:4222`,
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`WILDPC_API_NATS_TOKEN=${secret:NATS_TOKEN}`. Each node publishes its
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(secret-stripped) registry to a JetStream **KV** bucket, renews a **presence**
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key, and watches for peers; remote deployments surface as `manager: none`
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@@ -324,7 +324,7 @@ Inspect + drive from the CLI: **`wildpc mesh status`** / **`wildpc mesh nodes`**
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**`wildpc mesh config list|get|set`** (or `GET /mesh/status`, `/nodes`,
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`/mesh/config`). Modules: `wildpc_api.nats_client`, `.mesh`, `.mesh_gateway`,
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`.mdns`; secrets via `core` `secret_backends` (file default, OpenBao opt-in).
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→ Full history + operations: **`docs/fleet-mesh-plan.md`**.
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→ Operations — health, a stale node, a sealed vault, adding a node: **`docs/mesh.md`**.
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---
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@@ -336,6 +336,7 @@ Inspect + drive from the CLI: **`wildpc mesh status`** / **`wildpc mesh nodes`**
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| Why wildpc is shaped this way | **`docs/design.md`** |
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| DNS resolution + the two TLS modes, acme recipe | **`docs/dns-and-tls.md`** |
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| Public exposure (cloudflared) one-time setup | **`docs/tunnel-setup.md`** |
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| Mesh operations: health, stale nodes, sealed vault, adding a node | **`docs/mesh.md`** |
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| Writing FastAPI services | **`docs/stacks/python-fastapi.md`** |
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| Writing CLI tools | **`docs/stacks/python-cli.md`** |
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| Writing React/Vite frontends | **`docs/stacks/react-vite.md`** |
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@@ -1,314 +0,0 @@
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# Fleet Mesh Plan — OpenBao + NATS
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**Status:** Phases 0–4 complete + verified live across **both nodes** (civil +
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primer), including TLS hardening (NATS + OpenBao). Merged to main.
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Remaining nice-to-have: the live curl+kill breaker demo (needs a peer-unique
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consumed service) — every underlying piece is verified.
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## Context
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Wild PC's mesh today is a deliberately minimal, read-only gossip: each node
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publishes a secret-stripped `NodeRegistry` to Mosquitto MQTT (retained) + an
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online/offline LWT, and peers aggregate it into `MeshStateManager`. It is
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LAN-only, unauthenticated, carries no secrets, and does nothing with what it
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discovers beyond display.
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The goal is a **purpose-driven heterogeneous fleet** (media server, security
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appliance, TV, comms handler, AI gateway) where nodes come and go as *expected*:
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shared LAN-wide config + selected secrets, discoverability + presence, and
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binding **by purpose** (a consumer needs `media-index`, not a hostname) with
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**circuit-breakers** so churn degrades gracefully instead of hanging.
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Two adopted, genuinely-open components (see licensing analysis in chat history):
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- **NATS** (CNCF, Apache-2.0) — replaces Mosquitto as the mesh substrate and does
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three jobs in one: pub/sub, **JetStream KV** (shared config + registry), and
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**TTL keys as presence** (a provider's key vanishes on death → the breaker
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trip signal, no separate health plumbing).
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- **OpenBao** (Linux Foundation / OpenSSF, MPL-2.0, Vault fork) — the secret
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authority behind wildpc's existing `${secret:...}` mechanism.
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Design stance: **static single-writer `role` authority, no consensus** —
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availability comes from followers running cached local state, not failover.
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NATS single-node matches that topology. Consensus stays explicitly out of scope.
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## Architecture — planes → components → code seams
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| Plane | Component | Primary code seam (verified) |
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|-------|-----------|------------------------------|
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| Transport + KV + presence | NATS (`wildpc-nats`) | `wildpc-api/.../mqtt_client.py` (whole file), `main.py` lifespan 62-77, `config.py` Settings |
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| Shared config + registry + presence | NATS JetStream KV | `mesh.py` `MeshStateManager`; new KV buckets |
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| Secret authority | OpenBao (`wildpc-openbao`) | `core/.../config.py:307` `_read_secret` (single chokepoint), `wildpc-api/.../secrets.py` CRUD |
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| Binding-by-purpose + breaker | Caddy gateway | `generators/caddyfile.py` `compute_routes` (`remote` kind + ignored `remote_registries` are pre-stubbed), `deploy.py:509-540` `_target_url`/`_requires_env` (local-only today) |
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| Authority role | `NodeConfig.role` | `wildpc_core/registry.py` / `manifest.py` |
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## Phased plan
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Each phase is independently useful; the risky secret-transport work is last.
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### Phase 0 — Stand up the two services (no behavior change)
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- **`wildpc-nats`**: a `SystemdDeployment` + `RunContainer` (`nats:2` with
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JetStream `-js`), data volume `/data/wildpc/wildpc-nats`, `reach: internal`
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(`nats.<domain>`). Follow the container YAML shape in `docs/tcp-exposure.md`
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(postgres example). Replace the Mosquitto provisioning in `install.sh`
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(`setup_mqtt`, `seed_mosquitto_config`, image/port consts) with NATS — or
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better, promote it to a bootstrap deployment YAML (today the broker is only a
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shell-provisioned container, not a declared deployment).
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- **`wildpc-openbao`**: `RunContainer` (`openbao/openbao`), data volume, a file
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storage backend, `reach: internal`, **auto-unseal** (local transit/key) so the
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node boots unattended (Decision 2).
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### Phase 1 — NATS as the mesh transport (swap Mosquitto, behavior-preserving)
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- New `nats_client.py` (async-native `nats-py`) replacing `mqtt_client.py`.
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Registry → a **JetStream KV bucket `wildpc-registry`** keyed by hostname
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(KV last-value replaces MQTT retained). Presence → a **`wildpc-presence`**
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bucket with a per-node **TTL key** the node renews (replaces LWT + the 300s
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`STALE_TTL` poll; note `prune_stale` is currently uncalled).
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- Wire in `main.py` lifespan; rename `mqtt_*` → `nats_*` in `config.py` (keep
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`WILDPC_API_` prefix). `MeshStateManager` logic is reused; the KV **watch**
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callback drives `update_node`/`set_offline` — and because `nats-py` is
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asyncio-native, the `run_coroutine_threadsafe` cross-thread hop for
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`broadcast("mesh", …)` **goes away**.
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- **Preserve the secret-stripping invariant** from `_registry_to_json` (env /
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run_cmd / wildpc_root never on the wire).
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- Rename MQTT-named fields: `models.py` `MeshStatus` (217-226) + frontend
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`types/index.ts` (326-330), `MeshPanel.tsx`. Drop `paho-mqtt`; add `nats-py`.
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Keep zeroconf peer-advert for LAN discovery **and** support explicit NATS seed
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URLs for cross-network (Decision 1); drop the dangling unused `_mqtt._tcp`
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browse. Rewrite `test_mqtt.py` → `test_nats.py`.
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- Fixes a latent gap: today the registry is published **on-connect only** (no
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periodic/on-change republish). KV writes on `wildpc apply` fix this naturally.
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### Phase 2 — Shared config + presence via JetStream KV
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- Buckets: `wildpc-config` (shared LAN config, **authority-written only**),
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`wildpc-registry` (per-node), `wildpc-presence` (TTL liveness).
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- Add static **`role: authority | follower`** to `NodeConfig` (wildpc.yaml).
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Pin **`civil` = authority** (Decision 3); only the authority may write
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`wildpc-config`. Authority-down ⇒ shared state read-only, nodes serve cached.
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- Followers **watch** `wildpc-config` and reconcile via `wildpc apply`. Presence
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key renewal is the churn signal for Phase 3.
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### Phase 3 — Cross-node `requires` resolution + gateway binding + breaker (keystone)
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- Extend `_target_url`/`_requires_env` (`deploy.py:509-540`) to **fall through to
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the mesh registry** when a `ref` isn't satisfied locally (today it's
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local-only). The ref is already host-independent — this removes the
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"must be local" restriction, not adds a concept.
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- Produce the pre-stubbed **`remote` `GatewayRoute`**; thread `remote_registries`
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into `compute_routes` (currently accepted-but-ignored) and into the Caddyfile
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write at `deploy.py:157` (currently passed nothing). Binding = a **stable local
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subdomain route** the gateway re-targets to the remote node's URL — the program
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sees one unchanging URL.
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- **Circuit-breaker:** gate the remote route on the `wildpc-presence` key
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(regenerate + `_reload_gateway` when a provider appears/vanishes), backed by
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Caddy passive health (`fail_duration` / `lb_try_duration`) on the
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`reverse_proxy` line in `_host_matcher_block`. Consumer degraded-mode =
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fallback target or clean 503. (Also carry `health_url` into the registry —
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it's currently dropped on `manager: none` refs.)
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### Phase 4 — OpenBao as the secret backend (last; needs the security foundation)
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- Introduce a **`SecretBackend` seam** at the single read chokepoint
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`_read_secret` (`config.py:307`) + the `wildpc-api/.../secrets.py` writer:
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`FileSecretBackend` (default, unchanged) and `OpenBaoBackend`. `${secret:NAME}`
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syntax is untouched; backend selected in wildpc.yaml or by env.
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- Followers auth to OpenBao (token / AppRole); **need-to-know scoping** via
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per-deployment policies. Keep the file backend as fallback; migrate secrets in.
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### Cross-cutting prerequisite (gates Phase 4 + any cross-network)
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- **Transport hardening**: NATS TLS + nkey/user auth (replace Mosquitto's
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`allow_anonymous`); OpenBao TLS listener. No secret and no cross-network link
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moves until this is in. Cross-network overlay (e.g. Nebula) is orthogonal and
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layers under Caddy later.
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## Verification (per phase, end-to-end)
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- **P1:** bring up two nodes; confirm registry + presence propagate over NATS and
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the mesh view (`/mesh/status`, System Map) is identical to the MQTT behavior.
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- **P2:** write a key to `wildpc-config` on the authority; observe a follower
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watch fire and `wildpc apply` reconcile.
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- **P3:** define a service on node A that `requires` a ref provided on node B;
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confirm the gateway routes cross-node, then **kill node B** and confirm the
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consumer fails fast (curl returns the degraded 503, not a hang) and **recovers**
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when B returns.
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- **P4:** store a secret in OpenBao; confirm a service renders it via
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`EnvironmentFile=` / `--env-file`; then disable the file fallback and confirm
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it still resolves.
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## Progress
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### Phase 0 — DONE + verified (2026-07-07)
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Both services stood up **alongside** the live MQTT mesh (no cutover yet):
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- `wildpc-nats` (`nats:2`, JetStream) — deployment
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`~/.wildpc/deployments/services/wildpc-nats.yaml`, config
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`/data/wildpc/wildpc-nats/config/nats-server.conf`. Verified: container active,
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`/healthz` ok, JetStream enabled (`/jsz` shows store dir + limits), and a real
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**KV round-trip** — created `wildpc-registry` (put/get) and a TTL
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`wildpc-presence` bucket (the presence primitive). Test buckets cleaned up.
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- `wildpc-openbao` (`openbao/openbao:latest`, v2.5.5) — deployment
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`~/.wildpc/deployments/services/wildpc-openbao.yaml`, config
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`/data/wildpc/wildpc-openbao/config/openbao.hcl`. Verified: initialized (1
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share / threshold 1), unsealed, **KV-v2 secret put/get/delete** round-trip.
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Unseal key + root token stored as wildpc secrets `OPENBAO_UNSEAL_KEY` /
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`OPENBAO_ROOT_TOKEN`.
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**Consciously deferred (tracked):**
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1. **Auto-unseal on boot.** OpenBao is unsealed now but a container restart
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re-seals it. The manifest `SystemdSpec` has no `exec_start_post` hook, so
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proper boot-unseal wiring lands with Phase 4 (either a small manifest
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addition or a companion oneshot). Manual recovery: unseal with
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`OPENBAO_UNSEAL_KEY`.
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2. **`install.sh` bootstrap parity.** Fresh-install provisioning still seeds
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Mosquitto; adding NATS/OpenBao there (and retiring Mosquitto) is bootstrap-only
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(no runtime impact) and folds in with the Phase 1 cutover.
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### Phase 1 — DONE + single-node verified; live cutover done (2026-07-07)
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MQTT/Mosquitto transport replaced by NATS JetStream KV.
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- New `wildpc_api/mesh_wire.py` — transport-agnostic registry (de)serialization
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(moved out of `mqtt_client.py`; preserves the secret-stripping invariant).
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- New `wildpc_api/nats_client.py` — `WildpcNATSClient`: connects, PUTs its
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registry to the `wildpc-registry` KV bucket, seeds from existing keys, watches
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for peer PUT/DELETE, heartbeats a re-PUT (crash liveness via the existing
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stale-TTL), and DELETEs its key on graceful stop (immediate peer-offline).
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Async-native → the paho cross-thread `run_coroutine_threadsafe` hop is gone.
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- `main.py` lifespan, `config.py` (`nats_enabled`/`nats_url`), `models.py`
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`MeshStatus` (`connected`/`nats_url`), `nodes.py` `/mesh/status` all rewired.
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- Frontend: `types/index.ts` `MeshStatus` + `MeshPanel.tsx` updated to the new
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fields. `mqtt_client.py` + `test_mqtt.py` deleted; `test_mesh_wire.py` added.
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`mdns.py` dead `_mqtt._tcp` broker-browse removed. `paho-mqtt` → `nats-py`.
|
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- **Live cutover:** `wildpc-api.yaml` env → `WILDPC_API_NATS_*`, `requires:
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wildpc-nats`; applied. wildpc-api healthy on NATS, `/mesh/status` connected,
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registry (9.7 KiB, 48 deployments) published to KV, **no secrets on the wire**.
|
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- Verification run: ruff clean; 89 api + 196 core tests pass; frontend `tsc`
|
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clean; runtime KV round-trip confirmed against the live `wildpc-nats`.
|
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|
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**Pending second node:** two-node mesh-view parity (peer sees peer, offline on
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departure) — needs the second LAN node running the NATS-enabled wildpc-api
|
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pointed at civil's NATS (seed URL) or a clustered `wildpc-nats`. Revert path if
|
||||
needed: restore `WILDPC_API_MQTT_*` env — but note `mqtt_client.py` is deleted,
|
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so revert = `git checkout main -- wildpc-api` then re-apply. The old Mosquitto
|
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`mqtt` service is left running (dormant) as a safety net; retire it once the
|
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second node is proven on NATS.
|
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|
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### Phase 2 — DONE + single-node verified + tested (2026-07-07)
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|
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- **`role` field** on `NodeConfig` + `WildpcConfig`, wired end-to-end:
|
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wildpc.yaml top-level `role:` → config → `_node_config` → registry.yaml →
|
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mesh wire. **`civil` pinned `role: authority`**; default `follower`.
|
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- **Presence** (`wildpc-presence`) — a TTL KV bucket each node renews on the
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heartbeat; expiry = the node is gone. Delete-on-stop for immediate departure.
|
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- **Shared config** (`wildpc-config`) — `get_shared_config` / `put_shared_config`
|
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(authority-gated: followers raise `PermissionError`), plus a watch loop that
|
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broadcasts a `config_changed` SSE (the follower `wildpc apply` reconcile hook
|
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hangs off this — inert on one node).
|
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- Hardened `stop()` to bound the NATS drain (can't hang systemd shutdown).
|
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- Verified live: all three buckets present, `civil=online` presence,
|
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`"role": "authority"` on the wire, authority write + follower-deny exercised
|
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against the running `wildpc-nats`.
|
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- **Tests added:** `core/tests/test_fleet_role.py` (role config load + registry
|
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round-trip), `wildpc-api/tests/test_nats_client.py` (role gating, hermetic),
|
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role round-trip in `test_mesh_wire.py`. Suites: **200 core + 93 api** pass.
|
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|
||||
**Pending second node:** the follower-side reconcile (watch `wildpc-config` →
|
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`wildpc apply`) is wired as an SSE hook but only meaningful with a peer.
|
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|
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### Phase 4 — secret-read backend DONE + verified + tested (2026-07-07)
|
||||
|
||||
- New `core/wildpc_core/secret_backends.py`: `SecretBackend` protocol,
|
||||
`FileSecretBackend` (the historical behavior), `OpenBaoBackend` (KV-v2 read with
|
||||
file fallback), and `build_backend()` selecting via `WILDPC_SECRET_BACKEND`
|
||||
(default **file** — production is byte-for-byte unchanged until opted in).
|
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- `_read_secret` (the single chokepoint, `config.py`) now delegates to the active
|
||||
backend. `${secret:NAME}` syntax untouched.
|
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- OpenBao token bootstraps from the file backend (it can't live in the vault it
|
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unlocks); a missing key / auth failure / unreachable server all fall through to
|
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file, so a partly-migrated vault keeps working.
|
||||
- Verified live against the running `wildpc-openbao`: a secret stored in the vault
|
||||
resolves through `${secret:...}` in openbao mode; file-only secrets resolve via
|
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fallback; missing → placeholder; **default file mode unchanged**.
|
||||
- **Tests:** `core/tests/test_secret_backends.py` (file hit/miss, backend
|
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selection, unreachable-vault + empty-token fallback). Suites: **206 core + 93 api**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Hardening:**
|
||||
1. **Write path — DONE + verified live.** `SecretBackend` gained
|
||||
`write`/`delete`/`list_names`; `wildpc-api/secrets.py` routes all CRUD through
|
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the active backend, so in openbao mode the dashboard writes to the vault.
|
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Verified: write→vault→read→list→delete round-trip against live OpenBao.
|
||||
2. **Auto-unseal on boot — DONE + verified.** Added `exec_start_post` to the
|
||||
systemd spec (general, `-`-prefixed so a hook failure never fails the unit);
|
||||
`wildpc-openbao` runs `/data/wildpc/wildpc-openbao/unseal.sh` (polls up, unseals
|
||||
with `OPENBAO_UNSEAL_KEY`). Verified: manual seal → restart → auto-unsealed.
|
||||
3. **TLS hardening — DONE + verified across both nodes (2026-07-07).**
|
||||
Reuses the existing ACME **wildcard cert** via `expose.tcp.tls` (the postgres
|
||||
mechanism) — services present a publicly-trusted cert for
|
||||
`<name>.civil.payne.io`, so clients verify against the **system CA with no
|
||||
custom CA to distribute**.
|
||||
- **NATS:** `tls{}` (wildcard cert in `/tls`) + `authorization{token}`
|
||||
(`$NATS_TOKEN` from the `NATS_TOKEN` secret). Clients connect to
|
||||
`tls://wildpc-nats.civil.payne.io:4222` with the token; `WildpcNATSClient`
|
||||
gained token support (a `tls://` URL → nats-py verifies via system CA).
|
||||
**civil + primer both cut over**; plaintext now rejected (verified:
|
||||
`certificate is valid for *.civil.payne.io, not localhost`).
|
||||
- **OpenBao:** listener `tls_cert_file`/`tls_key_file` from `/tls`; reachable at
|
||||
`https://wildpc-openbao.civil.payne.io:8200`. Auto-unseal + secret backend
|
||||
both use the HTTPS URL. Verified: HTTPS serves, **auto-unsealed over HTTPS**,
|
||||
plaintext rejected, backend reads a secret over HTTPS.
|
||||
- Coordinated cutover across the whole fleet (both nodes) with a brief,
|
||||
expected mesh blip; mesh isn't load-bearing so no service impact.
|
||||
|
||||
### Phase 3 — cross-node routing + breaker: logic DONE + verified against a real peer (2026-07-07)
|
||||
|
||||
**Real second node:** `primer` (192.168.8.129) migrated onto the NATS mesh
|
||||
(branch checked out, wildpc-api pointed at `nats://civil:4222` via a systemd
|
||||
drop-in). civil ↔ primer mesh confirmed over the LAN — **Phase 1 two-node parity
|
||||
done for real**, not simulated. (This also *restored* the civil↔primer mesh my
|
||||
Phase 1 cutover had split — primer was still on MQTT→civil.)
|
||||
|
||||
- `NodeConfig.address` — routable host peers proxy to (wired through registry +
|
||||
wire; falls back to hostname, which civil resolves for primer).
|
||||
- `compute_routes` now emits **`remote`** routes for services this node
|
||||
**consumes** (a local `requires` ref satisfied by an online peer), targeting
|
||||
`<peer-address>:<port>`. `_host_remote_block` renders a **fail-fast breaker**
|
||||
(2s dial timeout + passive health) for the there-but-wedged case; **presence
|
||||
expiry removes the peer from the route set entirely** (gone → no route) — the
|
||||
primary breaker.
|
||||
- `wildpc_api/mesh_gateway.py` — on peer join/leave/change (+ startup) the API
|
||||
re-renders the Caddyfile (same generator `apply` uses + remote routes for
|
||||
online peers) and reloads the gateway **iff content changed**.
|
||||
- **Verified:** 4 hermetic tests (route emitted / address fallback / breaker:
|
||||
peer-absent → no route / unconsumed → no route); **resolution against primer's
|
||||
real registry** pulled live from the mesh → `wildpc-api → primer:9020`; and the
|
||||
live integration proven a **no-op** on civil (Caddyfile hash unchanged, gateway
|
||||
healthy) since civil consumes nothing cross-node yet. Suites: **210 core + 93 api**.
|
||||
|
||||
**Remaining:** the full live curl+kill E2E (civil routing to a peer service, then
|
||||
failing fast on kill) needs a peer-unique service civil consumes — every
|
||||
underlying piece is verified, but the end-to-end demo needs that provisioning.
|
||||
primer is now a permanent mesh member on the branch (revert: remove the drop-in +
|
||||
`git checkout main` on primer).
|
||||
|
||||
## Decisions (resolved)
|
||||
|
||||
1. **Discovery — both.** Keep mDNS for zero-config LAN peer discovery *and*
|
||||
support explicit NATS seed URLs so the mesh can span networks. mDNS is the
|
||||
convenience path on-LAN; seed URLs are the cross-network path. Client connects
|
||||
via seeds when present, falls back to mDNS-discovered peers on-LAN.
|
||||
2. **OpenBao unseal — auto for now.** Auto-unseal (local transit/key) so a home
|
||||
node boots unattended; designed so we can migrate to manual/stricter unseal
|
||||
later (a supported rekey/unseal-migration, not zero-effort but planned for).
|
||||
Keep the backend seam clean so the switch is config, not code.
|
||||
3. **Authority = `civil`.** `civil` (the acme node, `civil.payne.io`) is pinned
|
||||
as `role: authority`; all others are followers. **Confirmed:** when `civil` is
|
||||
down, shared config/secrets go **read-only** fleet-wide and every node keeps
|
||||
serving its own deployments from cached local state.
|
||||
4. **NATS — single server now, cluster-ready.** Run one `wildpc-nats` today
|
||||
(matches the single-writer authority). Clustering is deferred but must be a
|
||||
pure config addition (cluster/routes block + a few more nodes) — no re-architecture.
|
||||
103
docs/mesh.md
Normal file
103
docs/mesh.md
Normal file
@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
|
||||
# Mesh — runbook
|
||||
|
||||
How the nodes find each other, share config and secrets, and route to each
|
||||
other's services — and what to do when that breaks. The design and its history
|
||||
are in git: `git log -p -- docs/fleet-mesh-plan.md`.
|
||||
|
||||
## What runs where
|
||||
|
||||
| piece | where | what it does |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `castle-nats` (civil) | `tls://castle-nats.civil.payne.io:4222`, token `NATS_TOKEN`; monitoring `:8222` | NATS JetStream: the mesh transport and its KV buckets |
|
||||
| `castle-openbao` (civil) | `https://castle-openbao.civil.payne.io:8200`, KV-v2 mount `castle` | the secret authority behind `${secret:…}` |
|
||||
| `wildpc-api` (every node) | env `WILDPC_API_NATS_ENABLED/URL/TOKEN` | the mesh client: publishes this node, watches the others |
|
||||
|
||||
Config and data: `/data/castle/castle-nats/config/nats-server.conf`,
|
||||
`/data/castle/castle-openbao/{config/openbao.hcl,unseal.sh,data}`. Both present
|
||||
the node's ACME wildcard cert (`expose.tcp.tls`), so clients verify against the
|
||||
system CA; plaintext is refused.
|
||||
|
||||
**Nodes.** `civil` is the **authority** (`role: authority` in `wildpc.yaml`);
|
||||
every other node is a follower (`primer` today). There is no consensus: when
|
||||
civil is down, shared config and secrets are read-only and every node keeps
|
||||
running its own deployments from local state.
|
||||
|
||||
**KV buckets** on NATS:
|
||||
|
||||
| bucket | holds | written by |
|
||||
|---|---|---|
|
||||
| `wildpc-registry` | each node's registry, secrets stripped | each node, for itself |
|
||||
| `wildpc-presence` | a key per node, TTL 90 s, renewed on a heartbeat | each node, for itself |
|
||||
| `wildpc-config` | shared fleet config | the authority only |
|
||||
|
||||
**Secrets.** `wildpc.yaml`'s `secrets:` block selects OpenBao (`backend: openbao`,
|
||||
`mount: castle`). There is **no file fallback** in that mode — only the bootstrap
|
||||
tier stays as files in `~/.wildpc/secrets/` (`OPENBAO_ROOT_TOKEN`,
|
||||
`OPENBAO_UNSEAL_KEY`). civil reads with the root token; followers with a
|
||||
least-privilege `wildpc-read` token, and `node_prefix` for per-node overrides.
|
||||
Write with `wildpc secret set`, never by hand (see AGENTS.md §6).
|
||||
|
||||
## Is it healthy?
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
wildpc mesh status # connected? transport URL, peers
|
||||
wildpc mesh nodes # each node: online | stale | offline
|
||||
curl -s localhost:8222/healthz # NATS up
|
||||
curl -s https://castle-openbao.civil.payne.io:8200/v1/sys/seal-status | jq .sealed
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
- **online** — the node's presence key is live.
|
||||
- **stale** — no registry update from it for over 5 minutes, but not yet gone.
|
||||
- **offline** — its presence key expired (90 s) or it left cleanly.
|
||||
|
||||
A peer's services are routed only while it is present; when it goes, its routes
|
||||
drop out and the gateway answers `404 no wildpc route for this host`
|
||||
immediately, rather than hanging.
|
||||
|
||||
## When something is wrong
|
||||
|
||||
**A node shows `stale` or `offline`.** On that node: is `wildpc-api` running
|
||||
(`wildpc service logs wildpc-api`)? Can it reach
|
||||
`castle-nats.civil.payne.io:4222` by that name (TLS checks the name, so an IP
|
||||
will not do)? Does its `WILDPC_API_NATS_TOKEN` resolve to the current
|
||||
`NATS_TOKEN`?
|
||||
|
||||
**OpenBao is sealed** (after a restart, if `unseal.sh` failed): every
|
||||
`${secret:…}` read fails and `wildpc apply` refuses to converge. Unseal by hand:
|
||||
|
||||
```bash
|
||||
curl -s -X POST https://castle-openbao.civil.payne.io:8200/v1/sys/unseal \
|
||||
-d "{\"key\":\"$(cat ~/.wildpc/secrets/OPENBAO_UNSEAL_KEY)\"}" | jq .sealed
|
||||
```
|
||||
|
||||
**NATS down.** The mesh view freezes and peers go offline; nothing else stops —
|
||||
each node keeps serving. `wildpc restart castle-nats`, then
|
||||
`wildpc mesh status` on each node.
|
||||
|
||||
**The certificate renewed and a client fails TLS.** `wildpc tls reconcile`
|
||||
re-materializes the wildcard onto both services and restarts them.
|
||||
|
||||
## Routine tasks
|
||||
|
||||
**Add a node.** Install Wild PC on it; on its `wildpc-api` set
|
||||
`WILDPC_API_NATS_ENABLED=true`,
|
||||
`WILDPC_API_NATS_URL=tls://castle-nats.civil.payne.io:4222`,
|
||||
`WILDPC_API_NATS_TOKEN=${secret:NATS_TOKEN}`; give it a `secrets:` block with a
|
||||
`wildpc-read` token and `node_prefix: nodes/<host>`; leave `role` unset
|
||||
(follower); `wildpc apply wildpc-api`. It appears in `wildpc mesh nodes` within a
|
||||
heartbeat.
|
||||
|
||||
**Use a service another node provides.** `requires: - ref: <service>` in the
|
||||
consumer's deployment. If no local deployment satisfies it and a present peer
|
||||
does, the gateway routes `<service>.<domain>` to that peer, with a 2 s dial
|
||||
timeout so a wedged peer fails fast.
|
||||
|
||||
**Shared config.** `wildpc mesh config list|get|set` — `set` works on the
|
||||
authority only.
|
||||
|
||||
**Rotate the NATS token.** `wildpc secret set NATS_TOKEN`, then
|
||||
`wildpc apply castle-nats` and `wildpc apply wildpc-api` on every node; peers
|
||||
drop until each is re-applied.
|
||||
|
||||
**Cluster NATS** (not done): add a `cluster {}` block and routes to
|
||||
`nats-server.conf` on each server — configuration only, by design.
|
||||
Reference in New Issue
Block a user