The `castle` CLI and the `castle-api` service are two independent in-process
drivers of `castle_core`. Each resolved DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR at import time from
its own process env (default /data/castle), persisted nowhere — so they silently
diverged, and `apply`/dashboard-apply crashed on a non-existent /data.
Make the loaded CastleConfig the single source of truth:
- Resolve data_dir/repos_dir only in load_config (env > castle.yaml > default),
anchored to the config root; drop the DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR module globals and the
import-time file read entirely — no global twin that can disagree with the file.
- Thread config.data_dir/repos_dir through ensure_dirs, _env_context, tls_dir_for
(now unified — deploy no longer inlines the tls path), and create/add/clone.
- ensure_dirs raises an actionable CastleDirError instead of a bare PermissionError;
the api surfaces it as 422.
- doctor: "data dir writable" check + WARN when CASTLE_DATA_DIR/REPOS_DIR env
overrides the file (the one remaining cross-process divergence vector).
- install.sh persists data_dir/repos_dir into castle.yaml (idempotent, non-default).
- Docs: registry.md globals + AGENTS.md roots.
Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 (1M context) <noreply@anthropic.com>
Expose raw-TCP services (postgres) by name at <name>.<domain>:<port> and
cut the gateway's ACME wildcard cert onto them so they present a trusted
cert. Replaces the proxy/public booleans with a single `reach` enum
(off|internal|public); legacy input still parses via derived accessors.
Core:
- expose.tcp{port,tls} + TlsSpec(material: pair|combined|off, reload)
- tls.py: materialize cert files from Caddy's wildcard, reconcile on
renewal; `castle tls` CLI; optional cert_obtained events-exec hook
(gateway.cert_hook, gated so a plugin-less Caddy still parses)
- apply waits (bounded) for the wildcard to issue before materializing so
a fresh-node TLS service starts with its cert in place, then scopes
materialization to the deployments being applied
- reach: internal|public requires an expose block (no silent no-op);
public raw-TCP guarded until tunnel support lands
- chain.pem (${tls_ca}) is the issuer chain (leaf stripped), a real CA
bundle distinct from cert.pem
- one shared ${...} resolver (resolve_placeholders) for env and container
run fields; run.env now expands like volumes/args; $$ escapes a literal
- validate the generated Caddyfile before reloading the gateway so an
invalid config never degrades routing
Docs: docs/tcp-exposure.md. Tests cover reach/expose validation,
placeholder expansion + escape, issuer-chain material, TLS materialize.
