castle deploy now manages the public zone's tunnel CNAMEs to match the current set of public: true services — creating missing records and deleting removed ones — instead of only printing manual 'cloudflared tunnel route dns' hints. New core/generators/dns.py reconciles via the Cloudflare API (stdlib only). It only ever touches records whose content is <tunnel_id>.cfargotunnel.com, so hand-managed records in the same zone are never altered. deploy._write_tunnel_config calls it in both branches (delete of the last public service cleans up its CNAME). Without a token it's a no-op and the manual route-once hints are surfaced as before. Token: ~/.castle/secrets/CLOUDFLARE_PUBLIC_DNS_TOKEN, a single DNS:Edit permission scoped to the public zone (the 'Edit zone DNS' template) — confirmed sufficient: that one permission resolves the zone by name and edits records, no separate Zone:Read needed. Separate from CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (ACME, internal zone). castle doctor gains a read-only probe that WARNs when the token is absent (CNAMEs stay manual) and FAILs when it can't reach the zone/records.
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Public exposure via Cloudflare Tunnel
Castle is LAN-only by default: services with proxy: true are reachable at
<name>.<gateway.domain> (e.g. <name>.civil.payne.io) through split DNS, and
nothing is on the public internet. This document sets up a per-service public
toggle — flip public: true on a service and it's also reachable from the public
internet at <name>.<gateway.public_domain>, via a Cloudflare Tunnel.
How it works
- Default private.
publicdefaults tofalse; a service is public only when you say so, andpublic: truerequiresproxy: true(it projects an already-routed subdomain). - Separate public zone. Public services publish at a different zone
(
<name>.pub.payne.io), so internal subdomain names never appear in public DNS. - The tunnel bridges public → internal.
cloudflareddials outbound to Cloudflare (no inbound holes, no public IP needed) and forwards each public hostname to the gateway on:443, rewriting the Host header and TLS SNI to the internal name so Caddy routes it and its wildcard cert validates. The public surface is exactly the set ofpublic: trueservices —castle deploygenerates the ingress from the registry. - One kill switch. Stop
castle-tunnel→ instantly nothing is public.
foo.pub.payne.io ──(Cloudflare edge, public cert)──▶ cloudflared (outbound)
└─▶ https://localhost:443, Host/SNI = foo.civil.payne.io ──▶ Caddy ──▶ service
One-time setup (owner steps — needs Cloudflare login)
# 1. Install cloudflared (Debian/Ubuntu) — it's NOT in the default repos, so add
# Cloudflare's apt repo first:
curl -fsSL https://pkg.cloudflare.com/cloudflare-main.gpg \
| sudo tee /usr/share/keyrings/cloudflare-main.gpg >/dev/null
echo "deb [signed-by=/usr/share/keyrings/cloudflare-main.gpg] https://pkg.cloudflare.com/cloudflared any main" \
| sudo tee /etc/apt/sources.list.d/cloudflared.list
sudo apt-get update && sudo apt-get install -y cloudflared
# 2. Authenticate and create the tunnel (opens a browser to pick the zone)
cloudflared tunnel login
cloudflared tunnel create castle # prints a tunnel UUID + writes creds JSON
# 3. Move the credentials into Castle's secret store (path the generator expects)
mkdir -p ~/.castle/secrets/cloudflared
TID=<the-uuid-from-step-2>
mv ~/.cloudflared/$TID.json ~/.castle/secrets/cloudflared/$TID.json
chmod 600 ~/.castle/secrets/cloudflared/$TID.json
# 4. Tell Castle the public zone + tunnel id (in ~/.castle/castle.yaml)
# gateway:
# ...
# public_domain: pub.payne.io
# tunnel_id: <the-uuid>
Then create the tunnel deployment at ~/.castle/deployments/castle-tunnel.yaml
(manager: systemd → kind: service):
description: Cloudflare tunnel — public exposure for public:true services
manager: systemd
run:
launcher: command
argv:
- cloudflared
- tunnel
- --no-autoupdate
- --config
- /home/payne/.castle/artifacts/specs/cloudflared.yml
- run
manage:
systemd: {}
Bring it online:
castle deploy # writes cloudflared.yml from public services
castle service enable castle-tunnel # start the tunnel
Using the toggle
Mark a service public in its deployments/<name>.yaml:
proxy: true # required — the service must be routed
public: true # also expose at <name>.pub.payne.io via the tunnel
Then just deploy:
castle deploy
castle deploy regenerates ~/.castle/artifacts/specs/cloudflared.yml from the
current set of public services and restarts castle-tunnel. Flip public back to
false (or remove it) and redeploy to un-expose — the hostname drops out of the
ingress immediately.
DNS: automatic (with a token) or manual
Each public host needs a CNAME <name>.pub.payne.io → <tunnel>.cfargotunnel.com.
Castle can manage these for you. Create a Cloudflare API token with a single
DNS:Edit permission scoped to the public zone — this is exactly
Cloudflare's built-in "Edit zone DNS" template. That one permission is
sufficient: it resolves the zone by name and creates/deletes records (no
separate Zone:Read is needed — verified against domain0.org). An account-owned
token (cfat_…) works (that's what this was confirmed with). Drop it into the
secret store:
printf %s "<token>" > ~/.castle/secrets/CLOUDFLARE_PUBLIC_DNS_TOKEN
chmod 600 ~/.castle/secrets/CLOUDFLARE_PUBLIC_DNS_TOKEN
With it present, every castle deploy reconciles the public CNAMEs against the
current public set — creating missing ones and deleting removed ones — and prints a
one-line summary. It only ever touches records pointing at this tunnel
(<tunnel_id>.cfargotunnel.com), so hand-managed records in the same zone are safe.
This token is separate from CLOUDFLARE_API_TOKEN (which is the ACME token for the
internal zone); the public zone is usually a different zone/account.
Without the token, castle deploy instead prints the exact command to run per host:
cloudflared tunnel route dns <tunnel-id> <name>.pub.payne.io
The part that isn't the tunnel
Reachability is the easy half. Anything public also needs, per service:
- Auth. "Public" rarely means "no auth." Put login in front — Cloudflare Access at the edge, an auth proxy, or the app's own (Supabase GoTrue). A public app whose privacy matters must actually enforce it (auth-gated shell + signed storage URLs, not just row-level security).
- Hardening. Rate-limiting / WAF (free on Cloudflare), and never expose admin or substrate-Studio surfaces.
Notes
- Requires
gateway.tls: acme(the tunnel forwards to the gateway's real-cert:443host sites). On anoff/internalgateway the origin bridge doesn't apply. - Cloudflare terminates TLS at the edge (it can see plaintext). For a
no-third-party-in-path variant, the same
public: truemodel can drive a self-hosted VPS + WireGuard edge instead — the toggle and generator stay; only the transport changes.